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Legal education in the United States is passing through
its winter of discontent. Those who are new to the law
schools-students and young instructors-are likely to be
unaware of how recently and precipitously the present
mood developed. Even those who have known the law
schools longer may by now have forgotten the confidence
and euphoria that were characteristic attributes of the
schools until no more than a decade ago. Legal education, of course, has never lacked criticism, and the most
searching and pointed complaints were those generated
within the schools themselves. The "explosion" of interest in interdisciplinary studies at Columbia in the
1920's, narrated by Brainerd Currie in his well-known
study; the realist movement; efforts to enlarge the scope
of law school curricula, such as the foundation-nurtured
movement to institutionalize international legal studies
after World War II-each reflected significant dissatisfactions with the law schools at various intervals in this
century. The dissatisfactions so expressed, however,
rarely implied a loss of confidence in the capacity of
legal education to make large and indispensible contributions to our public life. On the contrary, these movem1mts of reform affirmed the importance and potential
of law teaching and research; and the frustrations experienced stemmed largely from a conviction that the
capacities of legal education were being underutilized. It
need not be asserted that today this confidence has been
wholly destroyed or is incapable of reinvigoration; but it
has surely been weakened.
Brainerd Currie, who among his other distinctions
became a leading commentator on American legal
education, left a body of writings that provides a convenient bench mark to measure how far the present
malaise has proceeded. In a sprightly essay published
just twenty years ago, Professor Currie predicted that
!here would be no dramatic changes in law school training in the half-century following 1956. The changes, he
thought, would be "molecular" rather than "molar";
they would be the cumulative product of individual efforts, not the results of institutional upheaval. Professor
Currie could contemplate his prognostication "without
dismay," not because this most critical of men was complacent about the achievements of law schools in the
1950's, but because he believed that the essential conditions and assumptions of American legal education were
sound and sufficient to sustain a process of constructive
development. Such was also the conviction of most other
thoughtful persons in the law schools at the time.
The modern discontents with legal education differ
from those of even the recent past, both in degree and in
kind. It is well to identify the sources of contemporary
dissatisfactions and to be aware of dangers implicit in
them. Although it requires some hardihood to say so in
the present climate of opinion, nothing in the historical
record justifies the assumption of abject failure that is today frequently brought to discussions of legal education.
On the contrary, the record includes remarkable successes. During this century legal scholarship, first
through the compilation of great treatises and the
production of a law review literature, and later, through
efforts at legislative codification and restatement, went
far to rationalize and systematize disorderly common
law doctrine in the private law fields. It would be difficult to identify any other university department concerned with the social disciplines that achieved a more
palpable and far-reaching social impact than that of the
law schools in this particular. At least equally important

Hnd even more surprising was the influence of the law
schools on our public law. It is not easy to name an important development in these areas during the past two
generations that was not first advanced or cultivated in a
law school classroom or a law review article. During this
period a steady stream of young people fresh from the
law schools entered the legal profession. If it is true, as is
frequently asserted, that lawyers create problems as
well as solve them, it is also true that in the succession of
crises that have shaken American society in the twentieth century, lawyers of intelligence, flexibility, technical skill, and wisdom came forward to serve and advance
the public interest. If failures of professional responsibility are to be laid at the door of the law schools, the
qualities of mind and character revealed in these more
inspiring performances ought also to be seen, in part, as
the fruits of the law school experience.
These observations are not advanced in a spirit of complacent satisfaction. Failures have abounded. Each
observer will frame his own indictment. The law schools
have contributed all too little to the avoidance of an impending breakdown of American judicial administration
and have, indeed, sometimes revealed little awareness
that such a crisis exists. Until recently legal scholarship
has been insufficiently concerned with improving the
delivery of legal services, not only to the impoverished,
but also to the great bulk of the population. Some believe
that not enough is being done in the schools to develop
that educated compassion necessary, at least in some
areas of practice, for the lawyer to serve fully the interests of his clients. This and much more may be
entered on the debit side of the ledger. Nevertheless, the
achievements of American legal education are real and
substantial. This patent fact gives rise to the suspicion
that the precipitous loss of confidence, already mentioned, may be the product of something more than
failures in educational performance. Social facts can
alter rapidly in these times, but moods and ideology may
alter even more rapidly. If the present deflated views of
American legal education are in significant degree the
product of factors other than the actual performance of
the law schools, it is well that we know it. Knowing it we
may be able to evaluate more intelligently proposals
brought forward in these times for the future of legal
education.
It is important to note that contemporary attitudes
toward American legal education are expressed at a time
of endemic loss of confidence in our social and political
institutions. This loss of security extends to virtually all
aspects of our collective life. In the opening lines of a recent book, Robert Nesbit has written: "Periodically in
Western history twilight ages make their appearance.
Processes of decline and erosion of instituti'ons are more
evident than those of genesis and development."
Shadows become exaggerated at twilight, and appraisals
made at such a time may be distorted by a malaise that
has deeper causes than the performance of the particular institution under scrutiny.
Perhaps the primary danger for legal education in this
twilight interval is that we may be induced to abandon
our higher purposes and accept aspirations that are too
modest, whether viewed from the perspective of student
capacities arid commitments, the more effective practice
of the profession, the acquiring of socially useful
knowledge, or the more effective criticism and
reconstruction of institutional practices. The loss of confidence in intellectually and humanistically motivated
law training prepared the way for the rise of a new antiintellectualism in legal education, new not in kind or
quality, but in the breadth and intensity of its expression both in and out of the law schools. The new anti7

intellectualism insists on what my colleague, Paul
Carrington, has described as "instantaneous practicality"; it is impatient with any educational activity that
does not promise an immediate and discernable pay-off
in private law practice. It is concerned primarily with
the "how," not the "why." It displays small interest in
the substantive issues that confront this society. It
reveals a narcissistic fixation on the techniques of the
law office and the courts. It views askance the role of the
law schools as critics of the law and as sources of new
law. It gives short shrift to the obligation of the law
school. as an integral part of the university, to discover
and communicate new knowledge . It scoffs at
"philosophy" as wasting students' time or as incapacitating m for practical affairs. It is not an interest in
improved "skills" training in legal education that identifies the new anti-intellectualism; nor is it the desire to
equip students for a more humane and effective career
at the bar. Its essence is, rather, the narrowing of interests, the rejection of intellectual and humanistic concerns, the militant assumption that the test of an
educational endeavor is its impact on the law firm's
ledger. It is characterized by confident but wholly unsubstantiated judgments about the contributions of particular educational experiences to professional
proficiency.

the distinguishing characteristics of the modern era. The
rise of sciences of human behavior has attacked the
primacy of reason as a determinant of human activity,
and has given precedence to feeling, habit, social structure, unconscious drives, and manifold other non-cognitive factors in human existence. In the political arena intellect is required to bear a heavy burden of condemnation. Reason, it is said, has produced a science that
threatens humanity and an industrialism that erodes the
physical bases of human survival. It has stunted human
development by neglecting those aspects of personality
that require the cultivation of emotion and aesthetic enjoyment. So thorough-going has been the assault on "the
life of the mind" that those who value it have sought such
comfort as can be derived from Justice Holmes' rather
plaintive observations: " ... to know is not less than to
feel."
One of the more remarkable aspects of the current
assault on intellect is that it perhaps derives more significantly from within the universities than from without.
Certainly the most eloquent denunciations have been
launched from college campuses. In the confusions of the
late 1960's a group of younger faculty members and
students at a middlewestern university came together
under the proud banner, Brains Distrust. Similar movements rose and flourished for a season on other campuses. The phenomenon had its hilarious aspects. Rarely
has there been launched such a syllogistic attack on
reason . Some of the adherents were seriously engaged in
scholarly undertakings, and presumably were dedicated
to the devices of rationality in their scientific and professional lives. Their hostility to disciplined inteiligence
was confined largely to their public statements (the more
public the better). The effort to have one's cake and eat it
too, has not been restricted, of course, to such groups;
and one cannot positively assert that this dailiance with
schizophrenia resulted in lasting harm to those who indulged in it. The effects on their students are more problematic, however. The students heard the uncompromising attacks on the life of the mind, but their
teachers did not disclose, certainly they did not defend,
the values that they routinely embraced and employed in
the library and the laboratory.
The point being made is that, in significant part, the
origins of the malaise now being experienced in the law
schools are to be found, not in legal education's sins of
omission and commission, but in events and cultural
movements that typify our entire social life. This perception is necessary if one is to make realistic appraisal of
the present status and needs of legal education, and it in
no way challenges the necessity for inteiligent innovation in the circumstances of the late twentieth-century
world. Further analysis of the broad social influences
affecting the rise of the new anti-intellectualism in legal
education will be left to those better equipped to identify
and evaluate them. Not all of the origins of this phenomenon, however, require such analysis; some are to be
found closer home. Origins of the new anti-intellectualism also reside in the legal profession, the law faculties,
and among law students.
II

The attack on intellect is in no way confined to the law
schools in these times. Indeed, a weakening of faith in
the power of intellect might well be regarded as one of
8

In 1886 Christopher Columbus Langdell proclaimed:
"If law be not a science, a university will best consult its
own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a science,
it is a species of handicraft, and may best be learned by
serving an apprenticeship to one who practices." Thirtyfive years later, Thorsten Veblen, apparently unimpressed by the Langdellean claim to scientific status for
the law, observed that "law schools belong in the modern
university no more than a school of fencing or dancing."

From the time that responsibility for professional law
training in the United States became predominantly that
of the universities, a state of tension has characterized
the relations between the law schools and the practicing
bar. There is nothing surprising or necessarily alarming
about this fact. What is surprising is that, for the most
part, this inevitable tension has proved creative and one
that has beneficially served the interests of both the law
schools and the profession.

The advantages of the division of functions between
the law schools and' the profession, characteristic of
American legal education, have been apparent both to
the parties involved and also to foreign observers of
American law training. For the profession, the schools
have provided battalions of graduates adept in at least
certain professional skills, young persons of sufficient attractiveness to have induced vigorous competition
among lawyers and law firms to retain their services.
However lacking the graduates may have been in technical proficiency, they, for the most part, have shown considerable facility in acquiring the necessary skills when
placed in the arena of private practice. Many lawyers
left their schools imbued with motivations for public
service, and much.of the constructive achievement of the
profession can fairly be attributed to the interests and
examples of great law teachers as perceived by embryo
lawyers. However dubious some lawyers may at times
have felt about certain interests of law faculties, legal
research emanating from the schools has served the
profession well.
This symbiotic relationship between the schools and
the profession has also served the interests of legal
education. However constricting the influence of bar ex-

aminations and of alumni scrutiny, the schools have enjoyed a significant freedom in curriculum planning, experimentation with teaching methods, and research objectives. This freedom is the envy of many who teach law
in other countries that adhere to the Anglo-American
legal system, and it is the condition indispensable to the
continued health and vigor of the relationship between
university and profession. There are other contributions
that the relationship has made to the schools. Contacts
with a functioning profession, the testing of ideas (however unsystematically) against the actuality of an ongoing system, provide the law schools with a kind of
"reality principle," an advantage apparently lacking at
times in some other departments of the university involved in the study of social processes.
Yet it would be unrealistic and unwise to ignore the
fact of tension. Stress is an inherent feature of university-based professional training. This is true, in part,
because being an integral segment of a university, the
Jaw school assumes obligations and commitments that go
beyond the pragmatic interests of the practicing profession and that at times may conflict with them. The university law school inherits a knowlege-finding function
and a critical function . The objects of criticism will on
occasion be the law and lawyers. The focus of concern
must encompass areas of social interest of great importance but sometimes far removed from the practical concerns of the practicing bar. These facts are well understood by many lawyers, and this conception of legal
education has received not only the tolerance, but also
the aggressive support, of enlightened members of the
bar. This support has been based both on an appreciation of the social importance of having law schools perform these broad functions and on the calculation that
such schools are most likely to produce the best qualified
lawyers.
There is evidence that the tolerance upon which this
enlarged conception of legal education depends is
eroding in some segments of the bar and the bench. The
evidence to which reference is made does not consist of
the fact that traditional educational methods are being
criticized and that reforms are being urged. Many
lawyers, like many law teachers, favor a more clinically
oriented training and are persuaded that movement by
the schools in that direction will contribute to an enhanced professional competence and responsibility.
Such dialogue is indispensable to the processes of evolution and adaptation essential to the survival of any social
institution. What is being referred to is the note of acrid
hostility toward the law schools being sounded today in
some aggregations of lawyers, a rejection of dialogue,
and a view of legal education largely confined to the
narrowest of professional interests. It is not clear what
fraction of the bar and bench share these attitudes, but
the attitudes appear to be gaining at least the respectability of increasing adherents.
There has always been, of course, a current of feeling
within the bar similar to that just described. Not for
many years , however, has it been so widely and uninhibitedly expressed as in the period since the late
1960's. This is not the place for a complete canvass of the
causes of this development, but a brief glance can be
given at a few of the precipitating factors . The last
decade has been a period of discontent for the bar as
well as for the schools. It has felt the lash of public
criticism, and there has been a typically American
tendency on the part of some of its members to attribute
its difficulties to educational failures . The apparent
revolution in the attitudes of the younger generation
caused deep disquiet, and some lawyers associated this
anxiety-producing behavior of the young with the in9

fluence of the universities and university law schools.
The staggering burdens imposed on the courts raised
concerns about the courtroom competence of many
lawyers. The assumption that the problems faced by the
courts are created primarily by the incompetence of
young lawyers, however , has never been validated.
Some lawyers believe that an increasing distance is
developing between the interests and sympathies of
some law professors and the practicing bar. A few deeply resent the leadership of legal scholars in the movements that produced "no-fault" legislation in the fields
of personal injury and domestic relations and the reform
of probate procedures.
Whatever the causes, the largely dormant dissatisfactions with university-based law training have been
animated and given new and caustic expression. The
thrust of these expressions is toward a legal education of
constricted scope and lowered aspirations.

room unaccompanied by demands for clear and responsible thought may quickly degenerate into a kind of
propaganda or sentimentalism.

III.

Sources of the new anti-intellectualism in legal education are also to be found in the law schools, themselves,
and among law faculties. Law teachers, like members of
other university faculties, are sensitive to those characteristics of Professor Nesbit's "twilight age" that produce uncertainty and tentativeness in the pursuit of intellectual goals. Some have had their confidence shaken
in the traditional methodologies of legal education, but
have as yet been unable to devise alternative techniques that are comparably successful in achieving the
intellectual and humanistic ends of law teaching. It is,
however, student attitudes, soon to be discussed, that
have most profoundly affected the practices and assumptions of their teachers. At no time will a teacher worthy
of the name be indifferent to the expectations of his
students; and in an age of consumerism student demands
and dissatisfactions are likely to be given even greater
attention . Law teachers have reacted in different ways to
the anti-int~llectualism that pervades many students' attitudes. Some have found the student demands to be consistent with their own vision of law school training.
Others have succumbed after token resistance, while
still others continue to resist. Some of these latter, while
adhering to the values of intellectually rigorous and
humanisticaUy oriented law teaching, have encountered
exceptional difficulties in achieving effective communication with their students, difficulties that leave
both them and their students bemused and dissatisfied.
However these dynamics are to be weighed, certain
consequences are clear. One of these is that lesser intellectual demands are being made on students in some
law school classrooms today than a decade ago. This is
not because of a decline in the intellectual quality of
American law faculties. On the contrary, there has never
been another time in which so many persons of exceptional ability occupied positions in the law schools. Nor
is the issue precisely that of the decline of the "case
method" or of "socratic" dialogue. Whatever the teaching method, however, there must be intellectual dialogue
of some sort if intellectual skills are to be honed. Moreover, the dialogue must be sustained and intense . Few
will mourn the passing of the savagery that sometimes
defaced the teaching of the past. Nevertheless, little can
be said for a pedagogical exercise that permits a student
to leave the classroom believing that a slovenly effort at
analysis or generalization satisfies acceptable professional and intellectual standards. Involved in the question of intellectual rigor is the problem of value analysis.
Such analysis is the essence of humanistic education in
any discipline, but a discussion of values in the class10

Consideration needs to be given, also, to the relations,
if any, between the movement for enlarged clinical and
"skills" training and the rise of anti-intellectualism in
American legal education. As Dean Roger C. Cramton
has rightly pointed out, the impact of the clinical movement on the law schools is not adequately reflected by
the numbers of students enrolled at any one time in
courses designated as "clinical." The fractions of
graduating students who have had some substantial contact with courtroom litigation, for example, whether in
courses, extracurricular activities, or part-time employment, has grown enormously in the course of the last
generation. No doubt, the clinical perspective has also
influenced the teaching of traditional classroom courses.
It seems clear that the issues raised by the new anti-intellectualism cannot be epitomized as a conflict between
clinical and classroom instruction. The incontestable fact
is that both clinical training and traditional instruction
can be trivial or profound, can serve broad social and
humanistic goals or the narrowest of ends. Indeed,
properly conceived and executed, clinical programs advance the higher educational aspirations and support the
objectives of classroom instruction. The student, among

other things, is given an opportunity under field conditions to test his command of analytical skills, and is provided a broader basis of experience for evaluation of the
legal norms and the values expressed in the administration of justice.
Nevertheless, candor requires it to be said that certain
aspects of the clinical movement have, in fact, contributed to the rise of the new anti-intellectualism. Not
surprisingly the movement to introduce clinical experiences into legal education has encountered opposition and inertia; and, understandably, the clinicians
have felt frustration and disappointment. It is probably
true that the greatest obstacle to a more complete success
of the clinical movement has not been the opposition of
the law teachers who object to it on basic intellectual or
pedagogical grounds. More important have been the
doubts of other established faculty members, who are by
no means unsympathetic to the asserted ends of clinical
training, but who are bewildered about how to evaluate
the quality of clinical programs and instructors, how to
determine what features of traditional education should
be sacrificed to make way for it, and how to pay for it.
The resistances to clinical proposals encountered by
their supporters and the difficulties of law faculties in
fitting these programs within prevailing assumptions
about the measures of academic quality, tenure, promotion of clinical personnel, and the like, have produced a spate of unhappy consequences. Many clinical
instructors, naturally enough, resent these attitudes, and
some have felt themselves to be pariahs in the law school
environment. Some clinical instructors, believing that
clinical education in the law schools does not afford a
promising career line, have left these programs, and
often their leaving has reduced the quality of the clinical
training. Others have respon
occasion, with strident
public statements that not only proclaim the virtues of
clinical training, but also appear to attack the values of
an intellectually and humanistically based legal education. Some of these statements reinforce the less thoughtful attacks emanating from the bar in recent years, and,
indeed, often can hardly be distinguished in content
from them. This is doubly unfortunate because it tends to
give academic respectability to the least defensible
criticisms of the law schools, and also because the kind,
quality, and motivation of clinical training espoused by
the academic clinicians are likely to be very different
from that contemplated by the less responsible critics in
the profession.
And then there is the problem of money. Among the
most attractive features of clinical education is the
promise of close personal contact between instructor and
student; but it is this characteristic that, because of costs,
seriously limits the availability and growth of these
programs. In the last decade more than one American
law school, caught up in the enthusiam for clinical training, but unable or unwilling to allocate resources sufficient to support it, have nevertheless placed programs
in operation. In a few cases academic credit was given
for "field experiences," not only unsupervised by the
schools, but also about which the faculties were in
almost total ignorance. Ironically, such abdications of
responsibility have been publicly represented as giant
steps forward in the training of young lawyers.
Finally, there are certain features of the clinical
education movement as it has evolved that give rise to
serious, if more problematic, concerns. One of these is
the lack of hospitality shown by some clinicians to the
systematic use of empirical inquiry in efforts to place the
policy of the law on a more informed basis of fact. To be
sure, leaders of the clinical movement have displayed interest in utilizing those trained in the psychological dis-

ciplines to assist In defining and measuring the various
aspects of lawyer "competence." One misses, however, a
comparable concern for the substantive issues that our
civilization, and hence the law, must encounter in the
years immediately ahead. The clinical movement grew
out of a reformist tradition, and that tradition encompassed concerns that go beyond the methodologies of
legal education or the techniques of private law practice,
important as these latter matters are. The apparent isolation of many in clinical education from interdisciplinary
inquiry directed to great issues soon to challenge the law
may contribute to one of two possible postures. To the
extent that reformist zeal in the movement encompasses
more than the problems of law practice narrowly conceived, it may be founded on an ideology and policy imperatives that are fallible and that remain unexamined
or, indeed, undisclosed. A second possibility is that concern with substantive social problems may decline
further or disappear, and the movement may be largely
confined to the niceties of lawyer techniques. Either consummation would represent a loss of educational opportunity and quality.

IV.
In his remarkably prescient lectures entitled The Law
in Quest of Itself, Lon Fuller wrote over a generation ago:
The problem addresses itself finally to the law student. ... Shall
he search out the professor who can expound "the existing
law''. .. ? Or shall his preference lie for the man who can impart
an insight into the shifting ethical background of the law, a
background against which "the law as it is" appears as an accidental configuration without lasting importance? A similar
problem of choice confronts him in directing his own studies.
The way in which the law student decides these questions transcends in importance its effects on his own career, for, through
the subtle pressures he exerts on his instructors to teach him
what he thinks he ought to be taught, he exercises an influence
on legal education- and indirectly on the law-much greater
than he has any conception of."

Consideration of the contribution of modern student
attitudes and tendencies of thought to the new anti-intellectualism in American legal education requires that
several preliminary observations be made. First, none of
the tendencies to be noted are unique to students.
Without exception, the origins of these attitudes are to be
found in the larger society, and constitute evidences of
broad cultural trends. When expressed by students, however, they acquire a particular importance in the educational process; for they condition the communication
between teachers and students, and effectively influence the goals and achievements of legal education.
Next, it is by no means true that these tendencies were
unheard of in previous student generations. What is distinctive about the present situation is the intensity of
their widespread e.xpression in recent years. Finally, it
needs always to be borne in mind that many of these attitudes are closely related to other student characteristics which often reveal a generosity of spirit and
humanitarian concern, characteristics that are both attractive and of great social value. Nevertheless, as Professor Fuller's comment would suggest, the expectations
and proclivities of the students require candid consideration, for they constitute a major dimension in any
appraisal of the modern status of American legal education and its likely future evolution.
In the early 1960's a motion picture entitled Morgan
enjoyed a vogue with American young people, for it
appeared to capture a sense of the predicament in which
they found themselves. At one point in the film an exchange occurred, which according to best recollection,
went something as follows: "Morgan, you'd better watch
11

it!" "I would, but I can't find it." The plight of young people growing to maturity in that era was one that involved
just such insecurity. Whatever "it" was that could provide a secure basis upon which to construct lives or that
could even advance understanding of the terrible perils
that lurked on all sides, "it" could not be found . Nor,
since older persons were experiencing similar uncertainties, was it possible to condemn the young for their
confusion. They had grown to maturity in the cold war
with the possibility of atomic holocaust never far from
consciousness, and the rapidly intensifying struggle in
Viet Nam was raising somber premonitions.

Confused uncertainty experienced at such a pitch,
however, breeds tensions that cannot be endured for
long; and so as the 1960's progressed, it was perhaps inevitable that the youthful style should alter and become
characterized by the militant assertion of certitudes.
Many persons in a position to observe the student
generations in the closing years of the decade were able
to detect an unfulfilled "quest for certainty" going
forward under the cloak of rhetoric and dogmatism. One
observer asserted that the students were expressing
"panic disguised as moral superiority." It is not
necessary, of course, to assert that, for these reasons, the
student critique of American institutions and of adult
leadership wholly lacked point and validity. What can be
said is that the student attitudes were antithetical to an
intellectually and humanistically based legal education;
for these attitudes, or many of them, involved the closing
of minds.
The quest for certainty at the height of the student activism most frequently expressed itself in the insistence
that teaching should proceed from certain given political
premises, assumptions completely understood in advance and admitting of no challenge. The purpose, if any,
of university education was to acquire the practical tech12

niques necessary to implement those premises. As the
sixties made way for the new decade, this insistence on
political orthodoxy considerably abated, and a new
openness became evident in the classroom. Yet the
demands for certainty continue to be expressed in other
ways. There is, of course, nothing new about the appetite
of many students for propositions in black-letter print.
Nor can it be intimated that students' demands for a
more practice-oriented training represent nothing more
than the lack of intellectual fortitude. Nevertheless, the
insistence of many students on "instantaneous practicality" often seems more strident today than at many
times in the past. Conversations with students frequently reveal acute discomfort with the notion that
practice itself is a learning experience and that some
things can be better learned in the period following
graduation than in the law school. These insecurities
have provided and continue to provide resistance to a
conception of legal education sufficiently broad to
satisfy the manifold obligations of a university law
school.
A second set of student attitudes, springing from the
hedonism of modern life, has had perhaps an even
clearer impact on university education. There has
developed a widely held conviction in our culture that
individuals possess a kind of natural right not to experience pain. When pain is felt, the reactions are often
ones of indignation and bewilderment. These assumptions manifest themselves in student reactions to the
phenomenon of tension in law school education. That
tensions can be painful cannot be controverted, and that
they abound in professional training is equally clear.
Many modern students, having been denied the
knowledge that tensions may be normal and inevitable
incidents of the educational experience, conclude that
the pain they feel is essentially abnormal. Pain creates
self-doubts because it is seen as evidence of personal
deficiency or of illness. It also produces resentment
against the institution and the educational process that
engender it.
Closely related is the invincible conviction of many
students that learning under pressure is not simply inefficient and difficult, but that it is literally impossible.
Perhaps it is this that underlies the feeling of some
students that being called on in class and subjected to
challenge by the instructor and classmates, is somehow
undignified and demeaning. If it is assumed that the tensions of classroom interrogation disqualify the exchange
from serving as a learning experience, it may well be
seen simply as aggression against personality and comfort. These beliefs are so deeply entrenched that they
withstand convincing demonstration to the contrary.
Surely not only history but contemporary experience
reveal that profound learning is possible in conditions of
considerable pressure, that this is so much the normal
mode that pressures at some level, whether engendered
internally or externally, may be seen as indispensable
conditions of the learning process. When Dr. Samuel
Johnson was asked how he came to acquire his command
of Latin, he replied: "My master whipped me very well.
Without that, Sir, I should have done nothing." One
scarcely needs to espouse the revival of corporal punishment as a teaching device to protest the educational
ideology that has pervaded the lives of many university
students. The "learning is fun" ideologues have slain
their tens of thousands. Learning, in fact, is pain, at least
in those aspects of it concerned with the indispensable
discipline of basic drill . Paradoxically, learning confers
profound satisfactions, and the intellectual life involves
a kind of play. The pleasures, however, cannot be
achieved without experiencing the pains. Modern
technology has not discovered a short-cut to Parnassus.

v.

Like many other tendencies that do not withstand
analysis, the student attitudes just described nevertheless point to problems that are real. It is true that since
the inundation of law schools with applications for admission, competitive pressures have escalated, and student insecurities produced by an apparently declining
job market have added further to their intensity. That
these pressures have reached levels in some institutions
that are seriously counterproductive seems evident. The
situation is one that challenges the ingenuity and compassion of law faculties. Given the difficulty of the
challenge, it is not surprising that the ingenuity of
faculties has sometimes proved insufficient and that
measures have been adopted that compromise the essentials of sound education.
The relations of law faculties to their students in these
times cannot be characterized in a word. The student attitudes described above do not characterize all of the
students and probably not any of the students all of the
time. Most persons who have taught in the present
decade will testify to the presence of many students of
the highest capacities and the most attractive personal
characteristics. Yet there are periods, and the present
appears to be one, in which the cultural climate is not
propitious for the cultivation of intellectual and
humanistic values. When this is true, these tendencies
will be expressed by the students coming to the universities. At such a time, teachers, if they are to serve their
important function, are placed under the uncomfortable
obligation of resisting, in some measure, the main
tendencies of the age. This involves a dissonance in their
relations with some students, particularly distressing to
conscientious teachers who have always relied on the establishment of a sympathetic bond with their students as
an avenue of communication and as a means for mutual
learning. Happily, there are indications that the dissonance is at present lessening. In any event, the only
alternative available to the instructor is default and
capitulation.

The preservation and extension of an intellectually
based and humanistically motivated legal educatL:m is
the greatest challenge facing the American law schools.
Although attaining this objective will involve the resolving of a host of subsidiary issues- methods of instruction, the length of law school training, new systems of
funding the research and educational programs-we
should not permit debate of these issues to distract attention from the primary concern. In seeking this objective
it would be highly imprudent and irresponsible to ignore
the felt needs now being given vigorous expression by
students and practicing lawyers. It seems inevitable that
more systematic attention will be given to skills training
in the future than in the past. It appears equally clear
that the evolution of legal specialties and the demand for
continuing postgraduate education will add to the scope
and complexity of the American system of professional
legal training.
These new demands involve questions of method and
allocation of functions between school and profession.
They will not constitute a threat to the mission of university-based legal education unless they lead to the
sacrifice of other vital functions and bwer aspirations
for intellectual quality and for service to the larger society. What we have to fear is a narrowing of minds and concerns. With only slight emendation we can accept the
proposition formulated by John Stuart Mill over a century ago. In 1865 he wrote: "As often as a study is
cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw narrow conclusions .... The only security against narrowness is a
liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that a person is not likely to be a good political economist who is
nothing else." For the phrase "good political economist"
let the sentence read "good lawyer."

Francis A. Allen

13

